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Abstract
We develop an agent-based model to study the impacts of a broad
range of regulation policies over the banking system. It builds on an
iterated version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework and resorts
to the experience-weighted attraction learning scheme of Camerer and Ho
(1999) to model agents’ adaptive learning. Thereby, we can capture not
only the direct impacts of regulation policies, but also the ones that take
part through shifting agents’ adaptive strategies. Our results show that
the introduction of an interbank clearinghouse is a good instrument to
face the risk of contagion; the regulatory guidelines of the Basel Accord
are effective in reducing the probability of bank failure; and the adoption
of a deposit insurance can be adequate to avoid bank runs. However, we
also show that these policies have drawbacks, and can either reduce bank
activity or stimulate moral hazard.
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1 Introduction
Recurring financial crises all over the world highlight the importance of accu-
rate regulation to maintain stability. In order for policymakers to determine
the appropriate measures for each situation, it is essential to understand the in-
creasingly complex arrangements of financial networks. With that in mind, and
focusing on the banking sector, we have developed an agent-based model to as-
sess the outcomes of regulation policies, considering agents’ strategic responses
to shifts in restrictions and in the economic environment.
Our model successfully captures some important results regarding banking
regulation, broadly discussed in the literature. First, it shows how narrower
bank interest margins are associated with greater system development and, thus,
greater stability (Dietrich et al., 2015; Brock and Suarez, 2000). Then, it cap-
tures how the adoption of an interbank clearinghouse can reduce the risk of
contagion at a low cost in terms of credit supply to the real economy. Further-
more, the clearinghouse acting as central counterparty can increase interbank
activity (Jaremski, 2015).
Moreover, the model provides insights on the rationale of capital regulation
behind the Basel Accord and how it effectively reduces the risk of bank failure.
The model shows that banks’ choices of economic capital resulting from their
adaptive strategies lead to lower levels of capital allocation when compared to
the social optimal (Elizalde and Repullo, 2007), suggesting that the regulation
is in fact needed. It also shows that there can be a reduction of credit supply
in economies following the Basel Accord’s guidelines (Cosimano et al., 2004;
Ben Naceur and Kandil, 2007).
Furthermore, our model also generates important results to the discussion
involving deposit insurance schemes. The model captures how depositors can
shift the behavior of banks when monitoring their risks to avoid losses (Bennett
et al., 2015). However, despite being successful in reducing the probability of
bank runs, deposit insurance schemes can lead to higher risk of bank failure,
once they remove depositors’ incentives to enforce market discipline (Demirguc-
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Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2004).
The economic research on banking and systemic risk has come a long way
since the seminal works of Rochet and Tirole (1996); Allen and Gale (2000);
Freixas et al. (2000). Recent developments provide valuable insights by model-
ing financial systems as complex networks, so they capture the effects of various
degrees of interconnection and different network topologies (Eisenberg and Noe,
2001; Cajueiro et al., 2009; Upper, 2011; Gai et al., 2011; Acemoglu et al.,
2013; Glasserman and Young, 2015). Following that line, one approach that has
gained ground in the economic literature in recent years is the computational
technique of agent-based modeling. It is a modeling tool in use by the economic
research for a while now1, and provides an approach that allows models to drop
some strong assumptions, often necessary to the conventional analytic approach.
Maybe the most important of those assumptions is homogeneity between indi-
viduals, embodied in the figure of the representative agent. Instead, agent-based
models make room for heterogeneous agents, whose local interactions — ruled
by bounded rationality — cause systemic patterns to emerge (Epstein, 1999;
Gala´n et al., 2009; Borrill and Tesfatsion, 2011; Farmer et al., 2012). There-
fore, it consist of an appropriate approach to simulate complex systems, such
as interbank networks.
Our model’s basic structure — as in Temzelides (1997) — builds on an it-
erated version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) seminal framework. Besides,
the interbank network is formed endogenously, as a result of banks’ strategic
response to liquidity shocks2. As recently used by Pouget (2007) in his study of
financial markets, we resort to the Camerer and Ho (1999) experience-weighted
attraction (EWA) learning scheme to model agents’ strategies. This is the main
point where our model distances from the existing literature. The EWA learn-
ing model can be seen as a general learning framework that combines aspects of
1See Gallegati et al. (2003), Goodhart et al. (2004), Samanidou et al. (2006), Hommes
(2006), LeBaron (2006), LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008) and Iyetomi et al. (2009).
2For models that incorporate some sort of strategic behavior and endogenous network
formation, see Erol and Vohra (2014), Babus (2013), Zawadowski (2013) and Blume et al.
(2013).
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reinforcement learning (Roth and Erev, 1995) and belief-based learning (Fuden-
berg and Levine, 1998). Other agent-based models usually adopt less general
learning algorithms3 (Hommes, 2006).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we will discuss in details the model used in our analysis. We first explore how
the Camerer and Ho (1999) learning scheme brings important insights to agent
behavior modeling. Then, we explain each agent’s role and how they interact
with each other. Afterwards, we discuss market structure issues and how some
institutional setups are brought to the model. Finally, we conclude the section
with a comprehensive analysis of the events that take place in our simulations.
Section 3 is destined to the experiments’ results. We begin by discussing the
effects of the bank interest margin over the banking sector activity and stabil-
ity. We then proceed to regulation experiments, simulating the introduction of
an interbank clearinghouse acting as central counterparty and requiring collat-
eral and information disclosure from participants. Afterwards, we simulate the
adoption of Basel’s regulation guidelines, represented by an experiment setup
that reproduces their three regulatory pillars. The final experiment simulates
the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme when depositors enforce market
discipline over banks. Finally, Section 4 concludes our work.
2 The model
The model used in our analysis consists of an iteration of discrete-time simula-
tion cycles, which are based on the seminal structure of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Allen and Gale (1998) and Allen and Gale (2000). Furthermore, it en-
dows agents with bounded rationality, present in the ability to learn and adapt
their strategies according to the Camerer and Ho (1999) learning scheme.
In this framework, banks form endogenous networks, connecting their bal-
ance sheets through interbank loans. The need to form such networks arises
3For surveys on learning algorithms adopted in agent-based models see van der Hoog et al.
(2007); Kirman (2011).
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from banks’ adaptive strategies and the presence of stochastic shocks in the
economy. The framework’s primary goal is to analyze the impacts of several
policy designs, represented by exogenous parameters and simulation setups4.
In the simulations, we run a large number of cycles, each one divided into
three time horizons, t = 0, 1, 2. These time horizons and their implications to
the model can be summarized as follows5:
Period t = 0 can be interpreted as today. This is when banks set their
strategies for the cycle, i.e., they choose the initial amounts of real sector loans,
liquid assets, deposits and capital.
Then, in t = 1 — which can be understood as short-term horizon — banks
face a liquidity shock, represented by the fraction of impatient depositors that
withdraw their resources prematurely to anticipate their consumption. Finan-
cial institutions with liquidity shortage borrow either from other banks in the
interbank market or from the central bank.
Finally, period t = 2 can be interpreted as long-term horizon. This is
when the real sector loans mature, the remaining depositors consume and the
banks calculate their return on equity (ROE) in order to update their strategies
through the learning scheme. In this period, banks can become insolvent due to
losses in their real sector loans. They can also become insolvent due to financial
contagion through the interbank market.
To add flexibility to the framework, each agent is modeled separately. In
a few sections ahead, we will explore the role of each agent. Afterwards, we
discuss how they interact throughout the simulation cycle and how this affects
the financial system. However, we will first take a time to explore the learn-
ing scheme, as it will be crucial to the understanding of some of the agents’
behaviors.
4In some cases, policy parameters can be the result of adaptive learning from central banks,
as we will see ahead.
5For the sake of clarity, we will deepen this discussion further on this section, after each
agent’s role is covered.
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2.1 Learning
In a financial system with an endogenously formed network, the rationale behind
agent’s decision-making is a key aspect to determine how they will interact with
each other, what patterns will arise in the system and, ultimately, what will
be the outcomes of policies over the market. With that in mind, we adopt the
experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model, proposed by Camerer
and Ho (1999), to describe how agents choose strategies.
The EWA learning brings aspects of two different approaches to model
agents’ behavior, namely, reinforcement learning and belief-based learning. The
reinforcement learning approach has in its core the law of actual effects, which
claims that successful chosen strategies are more likely to be adopted again
(Roth and Erev, 1995). On the other hand, the belief-based approach, with the
law of simulated effects, claims that strategies not chosen, but that would have
been successful, are more likely to be adopted in the future (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998).
To understand how it works, we follow Camerer and Ho (1999) and first
define some notation. Let’s consider the case of a game with n agents indexed
by i(i = 1, . . . , n). The strategy space of player i, Si, consists of mi possible
choices, i.e., Si = {s1i , s2i , . . . , sji , . . . , smi−1i , smii }. The game’s strategy space is
S = S1 × . . . × Sn and s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S is a combination of strategies of
all n players. In turn, s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, s1+1, . . . , sn) is the combinations of
strategies of all players except player i. Finally, si(t) is the strategy actually
chosen by i and pii(si(t), s−i(t)) is his payoff, both in time t6.
Agents learning through the EWA scheme adapt their choices according to
the two laws mentioned earlier. In the model, this is achieved through the
strategies attractions, functions that reflect the initial predisposition towards
strategies, and are updated after the outcomes are realized, based on both ex-
perienced and simulated payoffs. The attraction update of strategy j for agent
i in t is:
6In our experiments, time t used here corresponds to simulation cycles.
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Aji (t) =
φ ·Ni(t− 1) ·Aji (t− 1) + [δ + (1− δ) · I(sji , si(t))] · pii(sji , s−i(t))
Ni(t)
,
(1)
where φ is the parameter used to depreciate past attractions, δ is used to weight
the foregone payoffs7 and I(sji , si(t)) is an indicator function, that assumes value
of 1 when sji = si(t) and 0 otherwise. Finally, N(t) is the measure of experience,
which is updated by:
Ni(t) = ρ ·N(t− 1) + 1, (2)
with ρ being the depreciation of experience. Together, ρ and φ capture cognitive
phenomena like forgetting and consciously discounting old experiences when the
environment is changing (Camerer and Ho, 1999).
Once with the attractions, the probability of player i choosing strategy j is
given by the logit model, also used by Pouget (2007):
P ji (t+ 1) =
eλ·A
j
i (t)
mi∑
k=1
eλ·Aki (t)
, (3)
with λ measuring the sensitivity of players to attractions, which captures aspects
of perception and motivation.
The values of parameters in the EWA learning for our agents will be discussed
when we get to the experiments. The variables used as payoffs by each agent in
the attraction function will be discussed in their strategy sections.
2.2 Banks
Banks are agents of central interest in this framework. They act as financial
intermediaries, channeling funds from depositor to firms. They also connect to
other banks in the interbank market and to the central bank, when needed. In
7Camerer and Ho (1999) point out that this is the most important parameter in EWA,
that captures the effects of the two basic principles of learning — the law of actual effects and
the law of simulated effects.
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each simulation, there are B banks in the economy, indexed by b and represented
by their balance sheets.
2.2.1 Balance sheet
Balance sheets are designed to allow banks to fund long-term illiquid assets
with short-term liquid liabilities, namely, loans — the bank’s main source of
revenue — with cash deposits. Therefore, banks face a tradeoff between the
risks resulting from lending too much and the forfeit revenue from keeping high
reserves. In the liability side of bank b’s balance sheet, we can find:
1. Capital, Kb. This is the bank’s equity, and have no costs. It is updated
throughout the cycle and used to evaluate the ROE, as we will see further
ahead;
2. Deposits, Db. These are liquid liabilities. Bank b have an exogenous
number of depositors, whose deposits add up to Db. The interest rate
paid by banks over deposits is id;
3. Interbank loans — when bank b is the borrower — IBb. Banks take these
loans in t = 1, when they face the liquidity shock; they mature in t = 2,
therefore, its maturity is of one period. The interest rate in the interbank
market, cost of these loans, is ii;
4. Central bank loans, CBb. Like interbank loans, central bank loans are
used in period t = 1 to face liquidity shortage. They also have maturity
of one period. Their cost is icb.
Except for the capital, which has no cost, all the liabilities’ costs are exoge-
nous and identical to the entire system. Table 1 summarizes the liability side
of banks’ balance sheets.
The assets of bank b are:
1. Liquid assets, Lb. These are cash or cash equivalents and constitute the
bank’s reserves. They are used to face the depositors’ withdraw requests
and produce no return;
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Table 1: Banks’ liabilities
Symbol Liability Maturity Cost
Kb Capital - -
Db Deposits t+ 2 id
IBb Interbank loans t+ 1 ii
CBb Central bank loans t+ 1 icb
2. Interbank loans — when bank b is the lender — ILb. These are the same
loans discussed in the liability side of the balance sheet, therefore work
the same way, except that here bank b will have return of ii instead of a
cost;
3. Real sector loans, Rb. These are long-term (two periods) loans to real
sector firms. These loans are made on t = 0 and mature on t = 2.
Bank b lends to the set Fb of firms — which are represented individually
— and the aggregate amount Rb corresponds to the sum of those firms’
loans. Therefore, the return of this asset depends on how each loan will
perform8. The expected return of bank b’s real sector loans is E(rb).
Table 2 summarizes the assets of banks.
Table 2: Banks’ assets
Symbol Asset Maturity Return
Lb Liquid assets t -
ILb Interbank loans t+ 1 ii
Rb Real sector loans t+ 2 rb
In order for banks to have incentives to lend to the real sector funded by
deposits, there must be a positive spread between their rates9, i.e., E(rb)− id >
8Firm’s behavior and the determinants of real sector loan’s returns will be addressed ahead.
9As there is no fixed return to real sector loans — instead there is a distribution of returns
— we must consider its expected value. Nevertheless, the condition mentioned in the text
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0. Furthermore, we do not want banks to fund real sector loans with central
bank loans. Thus, we must observe the condition E(rb)− icb < 0, when setting
the exogenous rates. Finally, the interbank interest rate should lay between
deposits’ cost id and expected return from real sector loans E(rb). Summarizing
this in one rule, we have:
icb > E(rb) > ii > id. (4)
2.2.2 Bank strategy
During simulations, banks play an iterated simultaneous game, in which they
try to maximize their ROE. In the stage game, the strategy of bank b, sjb, is
represented by (αj , βj), where αj represents the ratio of capital to total liability
and βj represents the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. The size of bank b is
exogenously set and represented by Tb. It corresponds to the sum of all assets
or, likewise, the sum of all liabilities.
Thus, as in the beginning of each cycle (t = 0) there is no interbank activity
— it will only take place in t = 1 — the entire balance sheet is determined by
the choice of strategy sjb and by the exogenous size parameter Tb, as follows:
1. Capital:
Kb = α
j · Tb; (5)
2. Deposits:
Db = (1− αj) · Tb; (6)
3. Liquid assets:
Lb = β
j · Tb; (7)
4. Real sector loans:
Rb = (1− βj) · Tb. (8)
must still hold.
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By the end of a cycle, bank b will calculate its profit (loss) as:
Πb = K
2
b −K0b , (9)
where the superscripts in K0b and K
2
b are the periods t in which the capital was
measured. Afterwards, ROEb, the variable taken in account by the learning
scheme, is calculated as:
ROEb =
Πb
K0b
. (10)
As we are concerned with policy implications in our analysis, it is interesting
to define one more ratio here, which will be used further ahead: the capital
adequacy ratio (CAR).
A bank’s CAR is the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA). In this
framework, liquid assets are not included in the RWA — there are no relevant
risks involving those assets —, while real sector loans and interbank loans are.
Thus, for bank b, we have:
CARb =
Kb
ILb +
∑
f∈Fb
Rb,f · wf . (11)
Eq. (11) was written this way to emphasize that firms can have different
risk weights. This will be discussed ahead, when we get to the description of
firms. For now, we must keep in mind that Rb,f is the loan amount to firm f
and wf is its risk weight. One should also recall from the previous section that
Kb and ILb are capital and interbank loans, respectively, and Fb is the set of
firms borrowing from bank b.
If needed, a bank can adjust its CAR by selling part of its loan portfolio
before it matures. In that case, it will incur a discount of δL to reflect the loss
due to the asset’s low liquidity.
2.3 Central bank
In our experiments, we are concerned with the central bank’s purpose to main-
tain the financial system stability, namely, by acting as lender of last resort or
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financial system supervisor. Its role concerning monetary policy issues are set
aside, as it does not offer much insight to our analysis.
When the central bank acts as lender of last resort, it helps banks with
liquidity shortage. This happens when a bank does not hold enough liquid
assets to face withdraws and cannot get enough liquidity from the interbank
market. In this case, it can turn to the central bank to get the amount of
liquidity necessary to honor the depositors’ requests.
The role of system supervisor is performed through the establishment of
capital requirements. In this case, the central bank sets the minimum capital
adequacy ratio (CARmin) a bank must have in order to continue operating, i.e.,
all banks b must meet the constraint CARb ≥ CARmin. If a bank’s capital
adequacy ratio is below the minimum established, the central bank will force
it to raise to the minimum. If it fails to do so, the central bank liquidates the
bank.
2.3.1 Central bank strategy
In the cases that the central bank acts as the system supervisor, the capital
requirement is set strategically through EWA learning. The strategy sjcb is
represented by CARjmin and the outcomes are system stability, measured by the
number of bank insolvencies, and credit supply, measured by the total amount
of real sector loans in the economy10.
In this framework, the central bank follows lexicographic preferences, choos-
ing first strategies that lead to less insolvencies — more stability — then turning
to the real sector loans. In other words, the central bank will always prefer the
strategy that leads to the most stable system. Given two or more strategies
with the same number of insolvencies — same level of stability — it will choose
the one that leads to higher real sector loans.
10This approach is in line with Elizalde and Repullo (2007), who defend that regulatory
capital should be derived from a social welfare function that considers the cost of credit — in
our case, the effects on credit supply — and the probability of bank failure.
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2.4 Depositors
Following the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework, depositors’ withdraw
decisions will determine the liquidity shocks on banks. Depositors can be of two
types:
1. Patient, who will wait until period t = 2 for their deposits to mature, and
withdraw the amount deposited plus the return; and
2. Impatient, who will withdraw in t = 1 and give up the return, receiving
only the amount deposited. For simplicity, we consider that an impatient
depositor withdraws the total deposit amount in t = 1.
Depending on the experiment, depositors can make their decisions strate-
gically, according to the EWA learning scheme; or randomly, deciding with a
certain probability if they will withdraw their resources early. In our simula-
tions, there can be one or the other, according to what kind of analysis we are
interested.
When depositors do not learn, the probability of depositor d being impatient
is impd, set exogenously. This behavior is useful when we want to compare the
resilience of the system facing liquidity shocks of different severities.
2.4.1 Depositor strategy
When depositors act strategically, they try to figure out whether their deposits
are under jeopardy or not. Thus, the liquidity shocks will be the consequence
of the level of risks assumed by banks, given that depositors wish to maximize
their utility.
For a given depositor d, the risk tolerance parameter γd is the only parameter
used to define his strategy, sd. It represents the minimum capital adequacy ratio
he is willing to withstand in a bank, under which he decides to withdraw his
deposits. This means that, in t = 1, he compares γd with his bank’s capital
adequacy ratio CARb. If CARb ≥ γd he accepts the risk incurred by bank b
and waits until t = 2 to withdraw. On the other hand, if γd > CARb, depositor
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d will not assume the risk of keeping his funds deposited in bank b and withdraws
in the short-term (t = 1). Depositors are always risk averse, with utility function
given by:
Ud(c
1
d, c
2
d) = ln
(
c1d + c
2
d
Dd
)
. (12)
In the above equation, c1d and c
2
d represent consumption in short and long-
term and Dd represent the total amount deposited.
As all depositors have the same utility function and all of them are indifferent
between consuming one unit in t = 1 or in t = 2, they will always be willing
to give up the consumption of Dd in the short-term, to consume (1 + id)Dd in
the long-term, as long as the risks involved are acceptable. However, if they
wait until t = 2 and the bank that holds the deposits become insolvent, they
lose their deposits and cannot have the expected consumption11. Summarizing,
there are no inherently impatient depositors. What will determine if deposits
will be withdrawn early is the risk assumed by banks.
2.5 Firms
In this framework, firms do not act strategically. However, they are repre-
sented individually, so we can capture the heterogeneity between them. This
means that firms’ loans will have different ratings, losses given default (LGD),
risk weights and interest rates. Of course, the heterogeneities in each of these
features are only present in simulations when they are relevant.
One must also note that, in this model, firms’ demand for credit is inelastic.
This means that they will borrow as long as banks supply credit. When banks’
strategies lead to less real sector loans they are, in fact, leaving part of the
demand untended. This is how we measure the impact over the real side of the
economy in experiments. Firm f have the following parameters defining it:
1. Rb,f , the loan amount firm f took from bank b;
11In the case of an insolvency of banks, depositors can lose part or the total amount de-
posited. How bank insolvencies work will be discussed ahead.
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2. if , the interest rate payed by firm f ;
3. PDf , the probability of f not honoring its commitments (probability of
default);
4. LGDf , the loss given default regarding firm f . This is the loss a bank will
suffer in the event of a default in the loans to f ; and
5. wf , the risk weight of firm f . The risk weights are used to measure banks’
capital adequacy ratios.
Once with these parameters, we can calculate the expected return of bank
b’s real sector loans, as12:
E(rb) =
∑
f∈Fb
Rb,f · E(rb,f )
Rb
, (13)
where E(rb,f ) is the expected return of firm f ’s loan and Fb is the set of all
firms with loans in bank b. The expected return of firm f ’s loan, E(rb,f ), is:
E(rb,f ) = E
(
R2b,f −R0b,f
R0b,f
)
, (14)
where R0b,f is the loan amount firm f took from bank b in t = 0 and R
2
b,f is this
loan’s amount in t = 2, when it matures, which can be:
• R0b,f · (1 + if ), with probability 1− PDf ; or
• (1− LGDf ) ·R0b,f · (1 + if ), with probability PDf .
Hence, the expected value of firm f ’s loan in t = 2 is:
E(R2b,f ) = R
0
b,f · (1 + if ) · (1− PDf ) + (1− LGDf ) ·R0b,f · (1 + if ) · PDf
= R0b,f · (1 + if ) · (1− PDf · LGDf ). (15)
12Every expectation here is conditional to the information available in t = 0, when banks
set their strategies. For cleaner notation, we will omit the conditional expectations.
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Substituting Eq. (15) into Eq. (14), we have the expected return of firm’s
loans:
E(rb,f ) = (1 + if ) · (1− PDf · LGDf )− 1. (16)
Therefore, from Eq. (16) into Eq. (13), the expected return of bank b’s real
sector loans is:
E(rb) =
∑
f∈Fb
Rb,f · [(1 + if ) · (1− PDf · LGDf )− 1]
Rb
. (17)
Eq. (17) will be used to verify that the condition in Eq. (4) is met by
experiments’ parameters.
2.6 Interbank market structure
In this section, we discuss some issues that arise from the interaction of banks
in the interbank market, namely, information asymmetry and the existence of
a clearinghouse with collateral requirements. After that, we also discuss the
implications of bank insolvencies and how contagion occurs.
The features discussed here take part after banks face the liquidity shock
and seek the interbank market, in t = 1. They also affect the long-term, when
banks liquidate their interbank positions.
2.6.1 Information asymmetry
In this framework, there are two possible setups regarding the information par-
ticipants have about one another:
1. Perfect information, i.e., there is no asymmetry and each interbank par-
ticipant have full knowledge about each other’s balance sheets and risks;
2. Asymmetric information, when banks cannot perceive the risks assumed
by their counterparties and, therefore, cannot define their interbank rela-
tions based on how safe other banks are.
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Perfect information setups are important to assess the effects of market dis-
cipline in the interbank network. Under that assumption, banks will prefer to
sign loans with other banks that play safer strategies, aiming to minimize the
risk of an interbank default.
In order to incorporate this feature, we model the interbank market to func-
tion as follows: banks form two queues, representing supply and demand for
liquid assets. To get interbank discipline, those queues are sorted by capital
ratio (α) and then by liquidity ratio (β)13. In other words, banks with higher
capital ratios will have priority in the interbank market. When two banks have
the same capital ratio, the one with higher liquidity ratio comes first. The
practical effects of market discipline for banks are:
• When the entire interbank liquidity supply is exhausted, banks that could
not cover their liquidity shortage have to resort to the central bank or
sell illiquid assets at discounted prices to face withdraws. This makes it
valuable to be in the early positions of the interbank queue, and makes
market discipline an extra incentive for banks with liquidity shortage to
choose safer strategies; and
• On the other hand, if all banks demanding liquid assets satisfy their needs
before the market supply is fully lent, the remaining banks are left with
idle liquid assets until the long-term, in t = 2, having no returns over these
assets. Besides, even when a risky bank gets to lend its liquidity excess,
it lends to banks with riskier strategies as well, increasing the risk of a
default. Consequently, even banks with excess liquidity will benefit from
safer strategies under market discipline.
Despite the positive implications of perfect information to the financial sys-
tem, asymmetric information makes a more realistic assumption. When this is
the case, banks are unable to observe the strategies of other banks, and cannot
13Recall, from the description of banks’ strategies, that these are the parameters that define
a strategy sjb.
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determine whether they are risky or not. Thus, arises a problem of adverse
selection.
In this case, the interbank setup gets a little simpler. Banks still form two
queues, one for demand and one for supply of liquidity. The key difference
from the previous case is that, as long as banks cannot discriminate between
risky and non-risky counterparties, the participants are randomly sorted in both
queues. This produces the desired effect of the behavior of banks under adverse
selection.
2.6.2 Clearinghouse
The framework also allows us to study the introduction of a clearinghouse,
responsible for clearing loans and for collecting collateral from market partic-
ipants. Its purpose is to reduce systemic risk by assuring, at least partially,
settlements in the interbank market.
In the setups with a clearinghouse, it operates as the central counterparty in
the interbank market. Thus, when a bank needs liquid assets to face the liquidity
shock in t = 1, it signs a contract with the clearinghouse, and not directly with
other banks. This is also true for banks with liquidity excess. However, as the
clearinghouse doesn’t have any assets of its own — it only directs the excess
liquidity to banks with liquidity shortage — there can still be disequilibrium
between supply and demand. In this case, the priority determining which banks
will fulfill their transactions follows the rules discussed in the previous section.
As mentioned, the clearinghouse also requires collateral from participants
with debt positions, which have to commit resources to a mutual fund14. To de-
termine the total amount this fund must have, we follow the recommendations
from BIS (2001), which states that it must be large enough to ensure the com-
pletion of settlements in case of the default by the participant with the largest
debt position. Finally, every bank borrowing liquidity in the interbank market
has to provide collateral proportional to the size of its interbank loans. The
14Note that the collateral resources in the mutual fund must be available when the interbank
loans mature, i.e., in t = 2. Thus, real sector loans can be used as collateral.
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following equations summarize these rules:
gb =
lsb∑
i∈BS
lsi
·max(lsi), (18)
where gb and lsb are the collateral amount and the liquidity shortage of bank
b and BS is the set of all banks with liquidity shortage. This way, the mutual
fund’s size, G, will be:
G =
∑
i∈BS
gi = max(lsi). (19)
2.6.3 Insolvencies and contagion
Banks become insolvent when their losses exceed their capital. An insolvent
bank goes into a special liquidation regime, and the central bank gets responsible
for selling its assets and repaying its liabilities. In those cases, its real sector
loans suffer a penalty of δI in their value, which represents the losses due to the
depreciation of those assets in the market and the extra costs resulting from the
liquidation process15. Therefore, when a bank becomes insolvent, its losses are
far greater than when its capital is enough to absorb them. This feature brings
into the model the relevance insolvencies have in the real world, and adds an
extra incentive for banks to avoid it.
When the central bank repays the liabilities of insolvent banks, it prioritizes
central bank loans. Afterwards, the interbank loans are repaid and, finally, the
remaining resources are destined to depositors. If the insolvent bank’s resources
run out before the interbank loans are repaid, the unpaid interbank loans are de-
faulted. Therefore, contagion take place through the channel of direct interbank
exposure.
Interbank defaults can, depending on how connected banks are, spread losses
across the system. To measure how prone a setup is to contagion, we use the
number of insolvencies induced by interbank exposure.
15The rationale behind this argument is based on Diamond and Rajan (2001).
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2.7 Events within cycles
As previously mentioned, a cycle is divided into three periods: today, with
t = 0; short-term, with t = 1; and long-term, with t = 2. Below, we deepen
the discussion about the sequence of events within cycles, describing the agents’
decisions and actions in each of these time horizons16:
1. Today, t = 0. This is when agents make their decisions and the whole
model is set to the new cycle:
(a) This period begins with agents choosing their strategies, i.e., banks
set their values for (α, β), depositors set their values for γ and the
central bank sets the value for CARmin. To do that, they consider
the experience acquired through the EWA learning model in previous
cycles;
(b) Afterwards, the economy’s parameters are set. Here, banks’ chosen
strategies are used to calculate their amounts of capital, deposits,
liquid assets, and real sector loans, according to Eqs. (5) to (8).
2. Short-term, t = 1. In this period banks face the liquidity shock. Hence,
the interbank transactions emerge as a response to that.
(a) As mentioned, at the beginning of this time horizon banks face a
liquidity shock, represented by the withdraws of impatient depositors
(or depositors who perceive the risks of keeping their deposits as too
high).
(b) First, banks face these withdraws with their reserves;
(c) Afterwards, banks with insufficient liquidity borrow liquid assets
from banks with excess liquidity in the interbank market (directly
or through the clearinghouse, depending on the setup);
16The discussion here targets a comprehensive version of the model. Some of the events
described now may not be present in particular experiments. These particular cases will be
addressed in the next section, when we analyze the model’s results.
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(d) Finally, if even after interbank transactions some bank still do not
have enough liquid assets to face withdraws, it resorts to the central
bank, who acts as the emergency lender. The central bank provides
the liquidity needed to honor the remaining withdraws;
(e) The central bank then performs its role as the system supervisor,
acting upon banks whose risks — measured by the capital adequacy
ratio — are too high. The supervisor forces those banks to sell illiquid
assets at discounted prices in order to raise the CAR to meet the
requirements.
3. Long-term, t = 2. In the long-term, banks realize their profits; deposits,
interbank and real sector loans mature, and every agent updates its at-
traction function.
(a) The long-term begins with banks updating their balance sheets, by
updating their liabilities’ values according to their costs and their
assets’ values according to their returns;
(b) Banks whose losses exceed their capital become insolvent. The cen-
tral bank liquidates those banks, applying a penalty over their assets’
values. This further increases the loss for those banks, raising incen-
tives, in terms of payoffs, to avoid this situation in future cycles;
(c) Insolvent banks’ assets are used to repay their liabilities, as long
as possible and according to the priority discussed in the previous
section, namely, central bank loans, interbank loans and deposits, in
this order;
(d) Defaulted interbank loans can cause local losses to spread across the
system. In turn, the new losses can cause other banks to become
insolvent. Through this channel, financial contagion can cause local
events to assume systemic proportions;
(e) Closing the cycle, every agent updates the payoff of the actually
chosen strategy and simulate the payoffs of other strategies, in order
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to update the attraction function in the EWA learning model. An
agent calculates its simulated payoffs varying only its own strategy,
keeping fixed the strategies of every other agent in the economy.
When a cycle ends, the next one begins, and agents carry only the experience
acquired throughout cycles. All other variables are restored to their default
values.
3 Policy experiments
Our experiments will assess the impacts of different regulation policies over
the banking system17. In order to do that, we run simulations with policy
representations and compare them to their counterfactuals, i.e., simulations
with the same scenario without the adoption of the policy.
Simulations consist of Monte Carlo experiments, with a large enough number
of cycles repeated 100 times, so we have a distribution of results for each cycle.
The mean and its 95% confidence interval for those distributions are plotted
so we can assess how the variables of interest evolve in time. Besides, before
plotted, every result is smoothed by the LOWESS method18. The number of
cycles varies according to the time it takes for variables to reach a stable level.
As we are interested in the impacts of different policy frameworks over the
system, we need to define how we will measure each effect. The outputs of our
model and their corresponding measures are:
• Insolvencies. We use the total number insolvent banks, independent of
what led to insolvency;
• Contagion. Here, we use insolvencies caused by defaults in interbank
exposures. Note that this is a subset of the insolvencies measure;
17Our objective here is to run a handful of experiments to explore relevant policy setups.
We do not mean to explore the whole power of the model, which goes way beyond the scope
of this work.
18LOWESS, or LOESS, a locally weighted regression method, which combines multiple
regression models to smooth scatterplots (Cleveland, 1981).
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• Impact over the real side of the economy. As mentioned when discussing
firms parameters, we use the amount of real sector loans to assess how the
banking system affects the real side of the economy. As firms’ demand for
credit is inelastic, less loans mean untended demand, leading to production
projects not carried out by firms;
• Overall interbank dependencies. This is measured by the amount of in-
terbank loans;
• Bank runs. Measured by the number of banks which faced a large number
of withdraw requests in the short-term (t = 1). Captures the severity of
the liquidity shock over the system;
• Capital allocation. We use aggregated bank capital or average CAR. This
measure captures the capital buffer banks keep to face risks; and
• Banking sector profitability. Measured by the average ROE, it captures
the average return of one unit of capital in the banking sector.
Some other variables, such as liquidity ratio and aggregate liquid assets, can
also sometimes be used to analyze bank’s strategic decisions.
Recall that a cycle consists of the three time periods covered in the previous
section, with t = 0, 1, 2. Decision variables, such as the amount of loans banks
supply to the real sector or the amount of capital they decide to hold, are mea-
sured at the beginning of the cycle (in t = 0). Result variables — variables that
reflect interactions and outcomes, such as insolvencies, contagion or interbank
loans — are measured at the end of cycles, in t = 2.
We must also define the EWA learning parameters, which will be the same
for every simulation. The depreciation of experience, with ρ = 0, and the depre-
ciation of attractions, with φ = 1, associated with initial experience N(0) = 1,
make strategies’ attractions independent of the amount of experience. In other
words, strategies attractions will not be influenced by the number of past peri-
ods, just by what agents learned in them.
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The weight of foregone strategies δ = 1 results in equal importance for
strategies chosen and strategies simulated, i.e., the law of actual effects and the
law of simulated effects are equally important to agents. In the beginning of the
learning process, the probability of choosing a certain strategy is the same as
the probability of choosing any other, thus initial attractions are Aj(0) = 0, for
all strategies j. Finally, the parameter that captures the sensitivity of agents to
attractions in the logit model is λ = 1. Table 3 summarizes these parameters’
values.
Table 3: Learning parameters
Symbol Parameter Value
ρ Experience depreciation 0
φ Past attractions depreciation 1
N(0) Initial experience 1
δ Foregone payoffs’ weight 1
A(0) Initial attractions 0
λ Sensitivity to attractions (logit model) 1
As happens in the learning scheme, some of our model’s parameters will
be fixed in all of our experiments. Others seldom vary, making it interesting
to define a basic structure to our simulations. Therefore, the basic structure
consists of a setup with an interbank market and with the central bank acting
as lender of last resort, providing liquidity to banks that could not find it in
the interbank market. Besides, there is no interbank clearinghouse and banks
do not have information about each other’s balance sheets, thus, they cannot
observe their counterparties’ risks — there is information asymmetry, as de-
scribed earlier. Finally, all banks have the same size, depositors do not consider
banks’ risks in their withdraw decisions — which are determined by an exoge-
nous probability — and firms are assumed to operate in the same segment, with
the same value for the parameters that define them. Table 4 describe the basic
economy’s parameters.
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Table 4: Benchmark Parameters
Symbol Parameter Value
- Number of repetitions (Monte Carlo) 100
- Depositors per bank 100
B Number of banks 10
Tb Banks’ size (total assets or total liabilities) 1
id Deposits’ return 0.5%
impd Probability of impatient depositor 15%
Fb Number of firms per bank 50
ii Interbank interest rate 1%
icb Central bank’s loans interest rate 2.5%
δL Depreciation of illiquid assets sold before maturity 25%
δI Depreciation of insolvent banks’ real sector loans 40%
We now proceed to experiments. Over the next sections, we will discuss
the creation of an interbank clearinghouse, the adoption of the Basel Accord’s
regulatory guidelines and the implementation of a deposit insurance. However,
we begin by discussing the economic scenarios used as baseline in our studies
and, more specifically, the effects of the interest margin in the banking system.
3.1 Bank interest spread
It is not new to the economic literature that the level of development of the bank-
ing system exerts direct impact over economic growth (Levine, 1997; Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Beck et al., 2000). As an indicator of banking systems’
efficiency, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) propose the bank interest spread
— the difference between banks’ cost of funding and their return from loans.
Since the seminal work of Ho and Saunders (1981), research has provided
many causes to the diverging interest spreads observed across banking systems.
Those causes range from macroeconomic factors — such as inflation, mone-
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tary policy and economic cycles — to microeconomic factors — such as market
concentration, transaction costs and information asymmetries 19. Moreover, ev-
idence shows that wider interests spreads are more common among developing
countries (Dietrich et al., 2015; Brock and Suarez, 2000).
The impact of different interest spreads over the banking system is the first
issue we will explore in our experiments. Given that in our model all interest
rates are exogenous, we can explore this issue ceteris paribus, setting parameters
properly. In order to achieve that, we follow the Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(1999) definition of ex ante spread as the difference between the contractual
rates charged on loans, if , and the rates paid on deposits, id. Thus, we alter
only the interest rate of firms’ loans20, if , keeping in mind the restriction in Eq.
(4). Table 5 show the parameters for this experiment.
Table 5: Bank interest spread experiment parameters
Symbol Parameter Value
PDf Probability of default 4.5%
LGDf Loss given default 1%
wf Risk weight 100%
ihf High spread scenario interest rate 8%
ilf Low spread scenario interest rate 6%
Figure 1 compares the outcomes of the different spread scenarios. Panel (a)
shows that, with wider spreads, the system gets more unstable, with greater
number of insolvencies per simulation cycle. The width of the confidence inter-
vals also imply greater the volatility in this scenario.
Panel (b) did not show significant difference for contagion at 95% confidence
level. However, the two scenarios show different behavior, with the narrower
19See Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) for a comprehensive discussion on bank interest
spread determinants.
20The findings of Brock and Suarez (2000) also guided this choice of simulation setup. Their
results suggest that the interest spread is more correlated with loan rates than with deposit
rates.
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interest spread leading to the complete absence of contagion after about three
hundred simulation cycles. These results suggests that the wider interest spread
gets, the less stability is observed in the banking system.
Contagion is highly determined not only by the number of insolvencies, but
also by how interconnected banks are. Panel (c) shows that, with high interest
spreads, banks choose strategies that lead to greater interbank exposure, making
the system more vulnerable to contagion.
Looking at panel (d), we understand the key difference in banks’ strategies
that makes the high interest spread scenario more unstable: their capital allo-
cation choice. In order to maximize their ROE, banks choose strategies with
lower levels of capital allocation. This strategy reduces the capital buffer banks
hold to face losses. As a result, even small losses can trigger insolvency events,
which become more frequent.
Finally, panel (e) depicts an intuitive result: higher interest margins lead
to higher return on equity in the banking sector. In fact, the ROE of banks
facing wider interest spread were about four times their ROE when the interest
spread was narrower. Moreover, the width of the confidence intervals in panel
(e) shows that returns are more volatile with higher spreads. This is another
consequence of the greater instability depicted in panel (a)21.
In their study of the determinants of bank interest margins across countries,
Dietrich et al. (2015) found that lower interest margins are associated with more
developed financial systems. Brock and Suarez (2000) had similar results in
their study of Latin American countries. Our results follow the same direction,
suggesting that lower bank interest spread is associated with greater systemic
stability.
Despite not being a study of the direct impact of regulatory policies on the
interest spread22, which is exogenous to our model, this experiment provided
examples of how the stability of financial systems can vary across countries, what
21One must recall the effects of insolvencies over banks’ returns discussed in Section 2.6.3.
22For an assessment of regulatory policies over interest margins see Demirguc-Kunt et al.
(2003).
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Figure 1: Bank interest spread experiment results
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can, in turn, lead to different results from policy implementation. Therefore, the
scenarios in this section will serve as counterfactual to the adoption of regulatory
policies over financial systems with different levels of stability.
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3.2 Interbank clearinghouse
Clearinghouses are institutions that operate as central counterparties in many
financial markets, especially those operating derivatives23. They are designed to
insure counterparty risk by replacing the original contract between buyer and
seller by two new contracts, one between the buyer and the central counter-
party and another between the central counterparty and the seller (Koeppl and
Monnet, 2010). However, this alone is not enough to eliminate the risk from
default. Hence, clearinghouses usually require collateral — or margins — from
participants (Evanoff et al., 2006).
As described in Section 2.6.2, the clearinghouse structure adopted in our
model is a rather simple implementation, with the clearinghouse acting only
as central counterparty in the interbank system and requiring collateral from
banks. Other more sophisticated structures could involve clearinghouses deriv-
ing margin requirements from a maximization problem or even acting as lender
of last resort (Jaremski, 2015).
Empirical evidence suggests that the clearinghouse effects may differ ac-
cording to the economic environment (Jaremski, 2015). We, therefore, run this
section’s simulations using the two scenarios discussed in the previous exper-
iment as counterfactual. Thus, the baseline parameters are identical those in
Table 5 and the clearinghouse operates as described in Section 2.6.2, acting as
the central counterparty in the interbank market and requiring collateral from
member banks. Besides, it also requires information disclosure of participants,
in order to monitor their risks, eliminating information asymmetry as described
in Section 2.6.1.
Figure 2 shows the outcomes of the adoption of a clearinghouse in the more
unstable scenario discussed in the previous section — characterized by high
interest spreads. In panel (a), we can see how contagion was affected. This result
suggests that the clearinghouse is successful in reducing the risk of contagion in
23For surveys on clearinghouses and central counterparties see Knott and Mills (2002);
Koeppl et al. (2012); Koeppl and Monnet (2010).
30
the system. In fact, over the 100 repetitions of the 1500 simulation cycles with
the clearinghouse, there was not even a single case of bank insolvency caused
by contagion.
The reduction in systemic risk is not caused by the reduction of interbank
exposure, as we can see from panel (b). Despite not significant at 95% confidence
interval, this outcome suggests that if there were to be any shifts in the level of
interbank loans, it would be upwards. Empirical evidence supports this result
(Jaremski, 2015).
However, the gains in terms of stability comes at a cost in terms of real
sector loans. Panel (c) shows a slight, yet significant, reduction in credit supply.
Furthermore, although effective in the reduction of contagion, the clearinghouse
does not affect the number of insolvencies discounting those caused by interbank
exposure, as depicted in panel (d).
Figure 2: Clearinghouse experiment results
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Our simulation considering the more stable scenario — the one with nar-
rower interest margins — does not present significant changes in the presence of
the clearinghouse24. This happens due to the low number of insolvencies caused
by contagion in the baseline simulation. As our clearinghouse setups aims the
reduction of contagion, this result is rather straightforward. However, it is im-
portant to observe that the costs described in the unstable scenario experiment
are not observed in the stable one, suggesting that the clearinghouse costs in
terms of credit supply are only observed in times that the risk of contagion is
present. When this risk becomes insignificant, also does the reduction of real
sector loans.
3.3 Basel Accord policy framework
Nowadays, capital regulation is not an exception in banking sector policies
around the world (Barth et al., 2013). Since its first version, in 1988, the
Basel Accord’s primary goal was to promote the stability of banking systems
in response to increasing risk, by establishing minimum requirements on banks’
capital levels. In 2004, the accord’s revised framework, known as Basel II,
introduced the concept of the three pillars of baking regulation: (i) capital re-
quirements; (ii) supervisory review; and (iii) market discipline. The experiment
discussed in this section is based on this regulatory framework25.
In order for our model to capture the effects of Basel’s three pillars, we use
the combination of some of the features discussed in Section 2, as follows:
1. Pillar One: Capital Requirements. This pillar is explicitly present
in the setup, with the capital requirement mechanism functioning as de-
scribed in Section 2.3.
2. Pillar Two: Supervisory Review. This pillar is captured by the adap-
tive behavior of the central bank, who sets the capital requirements in
24For a clearer presentation of results, we will omit the figures for this scenario, once all of
the model’s outcomes remained at the same levels as those of the baseline.
25For the comprehensive version of the revised framework, see (BIS, 2006).
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order to reduce the systemic risk.
3. Pillar Three: Market Discipline. This pillar is present in the ability
of banks to observe each other’s risk parameters, as described in Section
2.6.1. This is achieved by the imposition banks’ information disclosure by
the system supervisor; hence, it is part of the policy setup.
Furthermore, a particularity involving this experiment is that banks now
have two loan portfolios: retail and corporate. For simplicity, we consider that
each portfolio corresponds to firms of different segments of the economy. Hence,
we can think of banks’ loans heterogeneity in terms of firms’ heterogeneity,
which will have different values for their parameters. Finally, the risk weights
used for the two kinds of firms follow the Standardized Approach to Measure
Credit Risk (BIS, 2006), for retail and corporate loans. Table 6 shows this
simulation’s parameters.
Table 6: Basel Accord experiment parameters
Symbol Parameter Value
irf Interest rate of retail portfolio’s loans 8%
PDrf Probability of default of retail portfolio’s loans 6%
LGDrf Loss given default of retail portfolio’s loans 75%
wrf Risk weight of retail portfolio’s loans 75%
icf Interest rate of corporate portfolio’s loans 6%
PDcf Probability of default of corporate portfolio’s loans 4%
LGDcf Loss given default of corporate portfolio’s loans 100%
wcf Risk weight of corporate portfolio’s loans 100%
Figure 3 show this experiment’s results. As we can see in panel (a), the
guidelines of the Basel Accord are successful in reducing the number of bank
insolvencies, thus leading to greater stability. Panel (b) shows that this happens
due to the improved capital buffer banks hold to absorb losses, as intended by
the Basel Accord.
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As mentioned earlier, the capital requirements are implemented as a re-
striction upon banks’ CAR. Panel (c) shows how the requirement shifts banks’
adaptive strategies. There are two noteworthy effects here:
First, capital requirements are binding, i.e., the minimum level of CAR
defined by the central bank is higher than the level banks would choose if un-
constrained. This is an interesting result in terms of the discussion involving
regulatory and economic capital. As Elizalde and Repullo (2007) define, regu-
latory capital is the minimum level imposed by the regulator, derived from a
social welfare function, as mentioned in Section 2.3.1, and economic capital is
the level of capital banks choose in the absence of regulation to face losses. Our
results suggest that banks’ economic capital are below the social optimal, what
supports the rationale for capital regulation behind the Basel Accord26.
Second, the actual capital level banks choose when restricted by regulation
is significantly above the requirement. This happens due to the policy response
to undercapitalized banks. As our model considers that banks that do not meet
the capital requirements are forcefully closed by the central bank, they choose
higher amounts of capital to avoid that losses reduce their CAR to levels below
the regulatory minimum. This result is in line with those of Elizalde and Repullo
(2007), who stress that such rigorous policy result in higher capital allocation.
Finally, panel (d) shows that, in addition to the increase in capital levels,
banks also reduce the supply of real sector loans to meet the restrictions upon
their CAR. This result suggests that Basel’s regulatory framework can, in fact,
result in a credit crunch in the economy, i.e., a significant reduction of the credit
supplied by banks, as suggested by the economic theory (Cosimano et al., 2004;
Ben Naceur and Kandil, 2007).
26For further discussion on regulatory and economic capital see Repullo and Suarez (2004)
and Elizalde and Repullo (2007).
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Figure 3: Basel Accord experiment results
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3.4 Deposit insurance
In order to improve the stability of banking systems during the global financial
crisis, a large number of countries strengthened their deposit insurance schemes.
This arouse the interest of economic theory on the effects of this instrument
on the banking sector. The literature stresses that, on the one hand, deposit
insurances can, in fact, reduce depositors’ incentives to engage in bank runs.
On the other hand, it also reduces their incentives to monitor banks’ risks, thus
reducing benefits from market discipline27 (Anginer et al., 2014).
Deposit insurances are an instrument to protect household deposits from
27In Section 3.3, we discussed the implications of market discipline in the interbank network.
In this section, we incorporate another form of market discipline, imposed by depositors. For
a discussion on depositor discipline, see Bennett et al. (2015).
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banking crisis, covering depositors’ losses in case of bank insolvency28. The
deposit insurance scheme adopted in our model provides full coverage to the
losses depositors may incur due to bank insolvency, thus, acting as a safety
net to household deposits. Therefore, it creates incentives for depositors to
avoid early withdraws, reducing the risk of bank runs. If a large number of
depositors decide to withdraw at the same time, illiquid banks could rapidly
become insolvent (Barth et al., 2004). However, it also reduces incentives for
depositors to monitor banks, encouraging excess risk-taking behavior. Empirical
evidence shows that the latter effect may offset the stabilization benefits from
the former (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2004).
To simulate the adoption of a deposit insurance during a period of financial
crisis, we use as baseline scenario a setup similar to that used as high spread
scenario in Section 3.1, which led to greater instability. However, in this ex-
periment depositors make strategic decision as discussed in Section 2.4, thereby
restraining banks’ risk-taking behavior and incorporating market discipline. We
then compare this baseline scenario to the same setup with deposit insurance
available.
Figure 4 shows the results for this experiment. As we can see in panel (a),
the adoption of the deposit insurance successfully reduces the number of bank
runs in the economy, with this risk being completely mitigated a few cycles after
the beginning of the simulation. Panel (b), in turn, shows that insurance uses
fall as agents adapt their strategies.
Panel (c) shows banks’ capital adequacy ratio. First, it is clear that market
discipline guides banks strategies toward safer levels. Comparing panels (c) and
(a), we can see that bank runs fall as banks raise their CAR, from what we can
infer that banks adapt strategies in order to transmit soundness to depositors.
However, panel (c) also shows that, in the presence of deposit insurance, there is
no more evidence of relevant depositor discipline avoiding risk-taking behavior
by banks. In this case, banks choose much lower levels of CAR, suggesting that
deposit insurance can, indeed, be associated with moral hazard.
28For a survey on deposit insurance schemes, see Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015).
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Finally, panel (d) shows the outcome of the adoption of deposit insurance
in terms of bank stability. This result suggests that moral hazard makes the
system more unstable, once it removes market discipline from banks’ strategies.
Not only was the number of insolvencies higher, the volatility also increased,
pointing to higher risk of bank failure.
Figure 4: Deposit insurance experiment results
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This experiment’s results are in line with the recent literature on the is-
sue (Barth et al., 2004; Anginer et al., 2014; Bennett et al., 2015). Barth et al.
(2004) and Anginer et al. (2014) argue that results like ours usually involve gen-
erous deposit insurance designs, which is the case in our simulation, as deposits
are fully covered. They also stress that other instruments, such as strict su-
pervision, can reduce moral hazard from deposit insurance. Following the same
line, Bennett et al. (2015) argue that regulators should stimulate information
disclosure of banks to promote market discipline.
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4 Conclusion
We have developed a new agent-based model to assess the impact of different
regulation policies in the banking system. Building on an iterated version of the
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework and incorporating bounded rationality
present in the experience-weighted attraction learning scheme (Camerer and
Ho, 1999), our model allows economic agents to learn and adapt their strategies
according to the regulatory environment imposed by the policymaker. Thus,
empirically observed phenomena such as connections in the interbank market,
market discipline enforced by depositors and moral hazard in the absence of
controls emerge from agents’ interactions.
We then run our model to assess some current issues involving bank reg-
ulation. We begin by discussing the effects of the bank interest margin over
the sector’s activity and stability. This experiment shows that, while increasing
banks’ returns, higher interest margins lead to higher risk of bank failure and
contagion. Despite not being a discussion on direct impact of regulation, this
first experiment provides two scenarios to study the implementation of policies,
representing different degrees of banking sector development.
We then show that the adoption of an interbank clearinghouse acting as
central counterparty and requiring collateral and information disclosure from
participants is successful in reducing the risk of contagion between banks. More-
over, this reduction comes at a low cost in terms of credit supply to the real
side of the economy. However, it did not affect the probability of bank failure
from risks other than interbank exposure.
The following experiment simulates Basel’s three regulatory pillars. It shows
that these policy guidelines are successful in reducing the risk of bank failure.
It also shows that banks do not choose the social optimal level of capital if not
regulated, supporting the rationale of capital requirements as an instrument of
banking regulation, the first pillar of the Basel Accord. However, the reduction
of the credit supply is significant in this scenario, suggesting that higher stability
comes at a cost in terms of the stimulus to the real economy coming from the
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banking sector.
Finally, our last experiment shows that the introduction of a deposit insur-
ance has two significant effects. On the one hand, it successfully reduces the risk
of bank runs, assuring that depositors will not have losses in case of bank fail-
ures. On the other hand, the insurance triggers moral hazard, once it removes
depositors’ incentives to monitor banks’ risk-taking strategies. Our results show
that the latter can outweigh the former, leading to higher risk of bank failure.
Although we have tackled some current issues involving bank regulation,
there is much room left to explore our model’s full potential. Following that
line, future works could contribute by combining regulation policies to under-
stand how they interact. For instance, one could check the results of Barth et al.
(2004), who stress that capital requirement is a good instrument to face the
moral hazard resulting from a generous deposit insurance scheme. The model
can also be used to explicitly study some of the features considered in our exper-
iments, such as the existence of an interbank market or the central bank acting
as lender of last resort (Freixas et al., 1999; Rochet and Vives, 2004). Further-
more, it can also be expanded to make possible the study of other regulation
policies. One example is the introduction of liquidity constraints, such as the
ones suggested by the Basel III framework (BIS, 2010).
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